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This paper presents an argument in favour of developing a multiculturalism policy for the EU, 
by reference to the potential role which could be played by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in this respect. The provisions on education and culture in the Charter are analysed, with a 
view to examining how they might be used – in conjunction with existing EU policies on 
education and culture – to engage with the issues of diversity, tolerance and respect which are 
raised by what is called the ‘promise of multiculturalism’. 
 
 
1. GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditionally, questions of education and culture have frequently been excluded from human 
rights instruments, because of the difficulties of definition, scope of protection and means of 
protection which are so commonly associated with social rights. Of course, the inclusion of 
economic and social rights in the Charter, alongside more traditional civil liberties and indeed 
political rights, was regarded as one of the great victories for the Charter and the process 
whereby it was elaborated – the now infamous Convention. Even so, the specific provisions 
on education and culture are hardly the most dynamic examples of the codificatory approach 
to drafting which lay at the heart of the Charter’s evolutionary process and of the intention to 
promote the indivisibility of the universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and 
solidarity. 
The provisions on education are a slightly odd little pot pourri. There is, first, the 
‘right to education’ itself, but with the link made between education and economic 
development in the crudest possible way through the addition of the right of access to 
vocational and continuing training (Article 14(1)). This provides the most concrete linkage 
between these provisions and the current provisions of the EC Treaty on the promotion of 
policies on vocational training and education (Articles 149-150 EC). In addition, there is the 
requirement that the right must include the ‘possibility’ of receiving free compulsory 
education (a strange phrasing in English) (Article 14(2)) and finally explicit recognition of 
respect for the freedom to found educational establishments, including a reference to the 
religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions of parents (Article 14(3)). This seems to 
guarantee, for example, the right to establish faith schools. These provisions should be read in 
the light of Article 10 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 24 (rights of 
the child). In contrast, there is only one provision on culture in the Charter. Article 22 sets out 
a guarantee of respect by the Union for cultural diversity, along with linguistic and religious 
                                                      
1   Many thanks to Tammy Hervey and Robert McCorquodale for helpful comments on the draft 
presented at the Nottingham Workshop: Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: a legal perspective, June 2002. This paper is to appear in T. Hervey and 
J. Kenner, eds, Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Oxford: Hart, forthcoming 2003); permission to include the paper in ConWEB is 
acknowledged with thanks to the editors and the publisher. diversity, and it is located for reasons that might require a little elaboration in the Equality 
chapter. 
Yet despite those cautionary words of introduction, we find something positive in the 
the very presence of provisions on education and culture in the Charter. Even though the 
Charter is declaratory, does not in any way develop Community competence, and has very 
uncertain effects vis-à-vis the Member States which have declined even to proclaim it as a 
formal instrument, these provisions are, in our view, none the less an important symbol of a 
developing awareness of issues such as multiculturalism and positive respect for diversity at 
the transnational and supranational levels, as well as the economic and cultural importance of 
education in modern societies. 
However, when we come to muse upon these provisions and the possible 
interpretations which could be placed upon them as the European Union gradually develops 
an enhanced human rights culture, we find a dark shadow has been cast over them by a 
conjunction of recent events and trends. We can name these events and trends quite easily; it 
would be much more challenging to try to unpick their consequences and effects, and to do so 
is beyond the scope of this paper. We can only hint at the background conditions under which 
any discussion of social rights pertaining to education and culture must proceed. In the 
shadows the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the securitisation agenda which has been 
taken up by the US and other states in the putative ‘war on terrorism’, as well as the more 
general reappraisal of policies towards foreigners, immigrants and ethnic minorities which 
has occurred in many western liberal states. Securisation policies have proved in many 
respects popular vote winners, and appear to chime with a widespread fear of immigration 
and its consequences in terms of the creation of increasingly multicultural societies. To 
promote policies of multiculturalism, especially those which promote a critical perspective 
upon immigrant integration and assimilation, apparently fails to respond to a popular wave of 
hostility towards outsiders and the fear that they take jobs, cause unemployment and ‘swamp’ 
supposedly monocultural and monoethnic societies (the latter being, in general of course, a 
myth maintained for the purposes of sustaining a concept of national identity). Yet since there 
is also widespread recognition that some economic migration is necessary because of labour 
market gaps in many Western countries, the discourse has shifted towards drawing an 
increasingly sharp distinction between legal and illegal immigration. Politicians’ rhetoric now 
focuses on the differences between legitimate mobility for the purposes of serving 
globalisation by ensuring that skilled human resources move to where the demand for them is 
best and illegitimate ‘bogus’ mobility on the part of those who ‘claim’ to be asylum seekers 
or refugees, but who are actually trying to get access to the relatively privileged informal 
‘grey’ labour markets of the western capitalist economies where there are large numbers of 
undocumented workers. Such rhetorics are widely thought to feed the attempts by far right 
political forces to foster hostility towards immigration, and to suggest that successful 
multicultural societies are simply a chimera. 
The electoral success and even entry of far right populist parties into some level of 
government, whether national, regional and local, in almost every Member State of the 
European Union has shocked much mainstream political opinion. Most of these parties 
operate on platforms which are anti-immigration and anti-foreigner, and they are often 
specifically hostile towards Islam and Moslems in particular. Interestingly, while the more 
centrist parties seem generally agreed that the EU – in policy-making terms – is part of the 
solution to resolving the problems and challenges of immigration in an increasingly 
globalised world, more extremist forces on both the left and the right tend to see it as part of 
the problem, destroying the capacity of the nation state to resist destructive global forces such 
as unwanted population movements and to build either authentic ‘national’ futures (the right) 
or to check the onward march of global capital (the left). In both cases, it is the deregulatory 
agendas which the EU is said to promote which are put under the microscope. 
It is impossible, in sum, to ignore the apparent dissonance or state of contradiction 
between on the one hand the assumed contribution which the proclamation of a Charter of 
Rights for the European Union ought to offer in terms of enhanced awareness of the promises 
and challenges of a human rights culture and of a policy of multiculturalism, and the current 
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chapter is whether there is a way out of this state of contradiction. 
 
2.  PREMISES AND FRAMEWORK OF THE CHAPTER 
 
2.1  Aims of the chapter 
In this chapter, we concentrate on the possible problem-solving or conflict-reduction capacity 
of an instrument such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in relation to some specific 
cases which can be linked to our general diagnosis of ‘malaise’ or worse in the heart of 
European societies, a malaise which appears to undermine the ‘promise’ of multiculturalism. 
To take the argument further, we need to define a number of crucial terms. 
 
2.2  The promise of multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism has become something of a political battleground. One of the themes 
underlying some of the political developments sketched out here has been an increasing 
questioning of the liberal acceptance of multiculturalism within a number of European 
societies – notably the United Kingdom and the Netherlands – as the most constructive and 
morally sustainable way for public policy to engage with the challenges posed by mass 
immigration especially since the second world war. Coincidentally, even in states such as 
France and Germany, where there has been no ‘official’ policy of multiculturalism, in practice 
there has been a convergence in many fields of public policy towards the types of measures 
(e.g. on housing, welfare or education) which would in other states such as the UK, the 
Netherlands or Canada, be recognised as fostering multiculturalism. In all these states, 
multiculturalism is encountering opposition. Most extremely, this involves the assertion that 
multicultural societies are inherently wrong, because they lead to the ‘dilution’ of the majority 
‘race’ (which is usually perceived as superior). More subtle versions of this argument present 
multiculturalism, not as bad, but rather as impossible, and argue that attempting to achieve 
this impossible goal leads to a fragmented society, lacking in patriotism and cohesion, and 
ultimately giving rise to serious conflict. Within this climate, we consider it essential to 
reaffirm the nature and goals of multiculturalism. Whilst, as shall be seen, it may not be 
possible to propose an ultimate solution to the challenges which a multicultural society 
creates, it is nevertheless important to assert the inherent value in such a society, and 
consequently the urgency of continuing to search for such a solution. 
The discourse of multiculturalism is a relatively new arrival on the social, political 
and legal scene, at least in Europe.
2 As a consequence, it is easy to forget, and must then be 
reasserted, that the facts to which multiculturalism is a response are not in themselves new. 
Since the Roman Empire at least, governments and society have had to grapple with the 
question of how to ensure social stability in a situation where a population is made up of more 
than one cultural grouping. At this stage, it is important to specify what we mean by culture. 
Within the discourse of multiculturalism, cultural groups are defined solely by ethnic or 
religious identity or affiliation. Within contemporary cultural theory, however, a culture can 
be based on many types of common characteristics: gender, profession, class, political 
affiliation, interests and enthusiasms, and much more besides. On this second understanding, 
we all belong to a number of different cultures and are ourselves multicultural beings, 
whereas, in the culture of multiculturalism, most people (although not everyone) can be said 
to belong to only one culture. Within the context of this piece, the narrower meaning is used. 
However, the insight that we are all part of a number of different cultures is a useful one to 
bear in mind, as an antidote to the kind of thinking that sees ethnic and religious groups as 
clearly defined, discrete, and completely determinative of human behaviour. We therefore 
reject essentialist thinking about human identity and human behaviour. In particular, we reject 
the tendency, sometimes evident in perceptions of multiculturalism, to reify ethnic identity by 
reducing individual identity to membership of one culture and by perceiving that culture as 
                                                      
2   In Canada, multiculturalism has been ‘official’ policy at least since 1971, when the word was 
introduced into national political discourse by Pierre Trudeau, if not earlier. 
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kind of society, individual identity is often affected by connections with a number of different 
cultural groups, as well as by factors which can only be equated with culture through a 
tenuous stretching of the meaning of that term  
  If the co-existence of cultures is a long-standing fact of human society, what, then, is 
the novelty of multiculturalism? One, narrow, view of multiculturalism would see it as policy 
or a set of rights which a state enacts in order to respond to the co-existence of cultures within 
their national territory. A multicultural policy gives specific claims and status to different 
cultural groups within the society, in order to ensure that they continue as distinct cultural 
groups rather than being assimilated into a dominant culture.
3 In this paper, however, we want 
to take a wider view than that. Raz has described multiculturalism as, in part, ‘a heightened 
awareness of certain issues and certain needs people encounter in today’s political reality.’
4 
Rather than being a discrete political theory, it is an indication of a new respect being given to 
diversity within society, which is itself perceived as a moral virtue. This respect given to 
diversity can express itself through the granting of rights or the creation of multicultural 
policies. However, those rights and policies are tools of multiculturalism, rather than 
multiculturalism itself. The distinguishing feature of multiculturalism is that the recognition 
of diverse cultures is seen as a good in itself, either because of the inherent value of those 
cultures and their existence, or, perhaps more persuasively, because respect for human dignity 
requires an understanding of the fact that belonging to a culture is an important part of being 
human.
5 
Our rejection of essentialism, however, should lead us to emphasise that this is only 
one part of being human. A criticism that can be made of multiculturalism as a political 
project is that it runs the risk of minimising the common humanity which individuals share, as 
well as the consequent possibilities of cross-cultural communcation.
6 This criticism is linked 
with that which would argue that multiculturalism, in allowing for differential treatment of 
people according to their identification with different cultural communities, is inherently 
inimical to individual equality. Answering this criticism would seem to require a lengthy 
discussion about the concept of equality and how it is achieved; a discussion for which there 
is no space here. Nevertheless, it can be observed that equality is not equivalent to sameness 
and that even traditional, Aristotelian conceptions of equality allow for different treatment 
insofar as differences exist. Whether the fact that, in the EU’s Charter of Rights, Article 22 is 
found in the section entitled ‘Equality’ means that its drafters saw the respect for diversity as 
an essential part of equality, rather than opposed to it, is unclear. The implication that cultural 
diversity involves just another equality claim is unfortunate, but it certainly dovetails neatly 
with the decision to locate the ‘culture’ provision of the Charter in the Equality Chapter. 
Here, a comparison with the Canadian context is instructive. The debates in Canada 
around the question of multiculturalism have been focused, to a large extent, on the question 
whether the protection of minorities is best served through the application of traditional rights 
and a rigid concept of equality, or through a more complex embrace of diversity, not 
necessarily based on rights discourse.
7 One of the significant problems which arises when a 
rights-based approach is used is the risk of clashes between different, competing rights. 
Looking at the list of rights contained within the Equality Chapter of the Charter, potential 
clashes can be identified between respect for cultural groups and the non-discrimation 
                                                      
3   See, for example, W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995). 
4   J Raz, ‘Multiculturalism’ (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 193-205 at p 197. 
5   For this view of culture, see, for example, C Geertz, ‘The Impact of the Concept of Culture on 
the Concept of Mind’ in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London, Fontana 
Press, 1993); JM Balkin, Cultural Software (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998). 
6   See A Kuper, Culture: the anthropologist’s account (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1999). 
7    See JC Bakan and M Smith, ‘Rights, Nationalism and Social Movements in Canadian 
Constitutional Politics’ (1995) 4 Social and Legal Studies 367-390 for a discussion of the 
limits of rights strategies in this context. 
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Consequently, any strategy for promoting respect for cultural diversity must be able to 
negotiate these clashes. 
 Many of the debates surrounding this problem are concerned with the situation where 
certain groups have a level of autonomy within the State and claim that their cultural values 
do not allow them to respect the rights claims of some of their members: groups such as the 
indigenous peoples of Canada
12 and the US,
13 and, in some contexts, religious groups in Israel 
and India.
14 In general, this situation does not pose a significant problem within the EU 
context, in that those groups or nations with autonomy claims are not ones which are likely to 
reject rights-based claims on cultural grounds. It is, however, an important issue to consider in 
the context of education, where the right to educate within a particular cultural context and/or, 
perhaps more crucially, according to a particular set of religious beliefs, may carry with it a 
claim for a degree of autonomy on the part of the school. May a faith school refuse to admit 
children from outside the faith, even when to do so would be indirectly racially 
discriminatory. May it teach different subjects to boys and girls? May it teach that 
homosexual behaviour is sinful, to the potential detriment to pupils who are coming to terms 
with their own sexuality? 
A number of proposals have been made as to how to mediate these conflicting rights 
claims. One argument, typified by the work of Kymlicka, would be to take an individualist 
approach, arguing that self-government must always be limited by the basic rights of 
individuals, and that consequently cultural diversity may not be used as a justification for 
discriminatory policies.
15 At the other extreme, some writers have argued that autonomous 
groups must be given full rights of self-governance, even if this means them violating the 
fundamental rights of their members.
16 Both of these approaches involve automatic 
prioritisation of one or the other set of rights; in the first case, individual rights, and in the 
second, rights to group autonomy. Shachar has taken a more subtle approach, propounding an 
‘intersectionist joint governance approach’, which would allow groups the right to define their 
own membership (and thus exclude people on the grounds, for example, of parentage or 
dogma), but require them to respect the non-discrimination rights of people acknowledged as 
members.
17 This approach, however, constitutes an uneasy compromise between competing 
rights, and does not always reach satisfactory results. On the one hand, it is unfortunate, to 
say the least, not to enforce the often hard-won rights of the individuals simply because it is 
cultural norms, as articulated by the leadership of the cultural group, who are denying them, 
rather than the State. On the other hand, cultural groups who are breaking free from 
oppression and marginalisation can perceive the imposition of individual rights claims as 
                                                      
8   The literature on this is substantial, and we draw on it for much of this analysis. The specific 
issue of the relationship between gender equality and cultural diversity is discussed in more 
detail in Costello’s contribution to this volume. 
9   For example, Islamic attitudes towards dogs can have an impact on guide dog users. We are 
indebted to Anna Lawson for this point. 
10   For example, is it always in the child’s best interests to be educated according to a set of strict 
religious and/or cultural values? 
11   Particularly in the education context, the desire of a cultural group to educate their children 
separately can be construed as racially discriminatory. 
12   See M Deveaux, ‘Conflicting Equalities? Cultural Group Rights and Sex Equality’ (2000) 48 
Political Studies 522-539. 
13   A Shachar, ‘Group Identity and Women’s Rights in Family Law: The Perils of Multicultural 
Accommodation’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 285-305; J Spinner-Halev 
‘Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, and the State’ (2001) 112 Ethics 84-113.. 
14   Ibid. 
15   Above, n 3. 
16    C Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’ (1992) 20 Political Theory 105-139; A 
Margalit and M Halbertal ‘Liberalism and the Right to Culture’ (1994) 61 Social Research 
491-510. 
17   Shachar, above n 13. 
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grant of womens rights can be characterised as ‘concessions to the coloniser’ and dismissed 
as cultural imperialism.
18 
Spinner-Halev suggests that the issue of oppression may hold the key to the 
problem.
19 The reason why multicultural policy is important, he argues, is because of the role 
it had in freeing cultural groups from state oppression. Therefore, any policy which is adopted 
must not serve to perpetuate that oppression. Oppression of an individual can take the form of 
a denial of individual rights, either by the State or by cultural groups. However, it can also 
take the form of oppression of the culture of which that individual is part. Both forms of 
oppression are detrimental to the individual; neither is acceptable. This complexity of 
individual identity is used by Eisenberg to formulate her difference approach to adjudicating 
cases where a respect for diversity appears to clash with individual equality. Eisenberg argues 
that such cases should not be dealt with in the form of a clash of rights, but rather by 
assessing the identity-related impact of the different claims, and choosing the claim which has 
the least impact on identity as a whole (understood as encompassing a broad range of 
characteristics including culture, gender, religion and language).
20 In other words, the 
decision is made which is least oppressive of an individual’s identity. 
A legal model which facilitates this idea is that of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which approaches cultural diversity, not as a requirement of equality, or a non-
discrimination right, but rather as a general principle according to which the rest of the 
Charter must be interpreted.
21 This means that other key rights within the Charter, such as 
freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, the 
right to fair and just working conditions and, as we shall suggest here, crucially, the right to 
education, must be interpreted in a way which respects the multicultural nature of the EU.  
This approach is effective for two reasons. Firstly, as Eisenberg suggests, it avoids 
the difficulties and conflicts inherent in mediating a clash of rights. Secondly, it recognises 
that multiculturalism should only require different treatment in situations where it is 
necessary to avoid oppression. As Kuper reminds us, the politics of difference represented in 
multiculturalism can give rise to extreme separatist – and consequently discriminatory and 
oppressive – policies such as apartheid.
22 Further, it is at least arguable that, even in the West, 
fundamental rights claims were often originally counter-cultural in nature, in that they gave 
rights to groups who had traditionally not had those rights. While genuine cultural difference 
should be respected, it is essential that it is not used as a mask for conservative resistence to 
reform, and individual rights must continue to be available to members of all cultures as a 
weapon against oppression, whatever its source. In this way, multiculturalism at its best can 
reflect our common humanity, not only through the respect of fundamental rights for all, but 
also through the acknowledgment that cultures are part of our common humanity. Further, 
multiculturalism can, at its best, facilitate cross-cultural communication and co-operation by 






2.3 Multiculturalism and EU policy 
                                                      
18   F  Mernissi,  Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society 
(Cambridge, Mass., Shenkman Publishing Company, 1975) at p vii. 
19   Above, n 13. 
20   A Eisenberg, ‘Diversity and Equality: Three Approaches to Cultural and Sexual Difference’ 
Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB 1/2001 http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb/. 
21   Article 27: ‘This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and 
enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.’ 
22   Above n.6. 
23    This constitutes a general defence of multiculturalism. As we will argue later, there are 
specific reasons why multicultural policies are necessary within the EU. 
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some kind, whether unitary or federal, which has to accommodate cultural pluralism within its 
boundaries. Questions then arise as to the place which a policy of multiculturalism may have 
within the EU, that is, within an entity which cannot be equated with a state but which has 
political authority. The argument that the EU ought actively, for specific as well as general 
reasons, to foster multiculturalism will be put forward in some detail later on; for now, 
however, it can be assumed that we believe that the case for multiculturalism is just as 
persuasive, if not more so, for the EU as for states. However, there are important questions 
concerning the way in which multiculturalism is to be promoted within the EU, given its 
particular nature. In the first instance, the thorny issue of competence and the principle of 
subsidiarity in Article 5 EC are relevant here. While Article 13 EC gives explicit (but shared) 
competence to the Community to legislate against racial discrimination (inter alia), this is 
only a very small part of what is necessary for the purposes of a full range of policies 
fostering multiculturalism, and there are no further obvious existing competences within the 
Treaties. Even beyond that, to what extent is it possible to argue that the goals of 
multiculturalism can only be sufficiently achieved at Community level rather than the 
national level, as the principle of subsidiarity would seem to require? Each Member State has 
a different cultural make-up and history and, it could be argued, requires a different approach 
to ensure effective cultural pluralism. In particular, given the important role which education 
plays within a wider multicultural policy, the fact that Member States continue to be 
protective about their sovereignty in the field of primary and secondary education has to be 
significant. However, the important point about policy-making in areas such as rights policy 
or education policy where competence is shared between the Member States and the EU – and 
indeed where EU competence might be thought only to be complementary to that of the 
Member States
24 – is to acknowledge that an appropriate policy mix may require some goals 
to be set at the EU level, while the bulk of implementation measures must be carefully 
tailored to domestic circumstances. Even goal-setting itself may need to be flexible to take 
account of differing national traditions and heritages. This could be where the so-called ‘open 
method of coordination’ and other ‘new governance’ instruments might usefully be invoked 
as flexible means for encouraging the sharing of best practice between Member States and 
requiring the benchmarking of national policies against each other.
25 
Secondly, it has traditionally been the case that, within its cultural policy and its 
foundational frameworks, the EU has been committed, not to the respect of all the cultures 
which exist within the territory of the Union, but primarily to the respect of the national 
identities of Member States (see, for example, Article 6(3) TEU). This has to be one aspect of 
multiculturalism within the EU, but it is by no means the only aspect. An EU policy of 
multiculturalism would require not only that the EU itself respect the minority cultures within 
Member States, but also that the EU encourage and require that Member States respect those 
cultures within their own territory. 
These questions about competence, and about the extent to which the EU can 
interfere in the cultural policy of Member States, render problematic the possibility of a 
comprehensive EU policy on multiculturalism. Legally, it may well be difficult for the EU to 
justify action in that area. Politically, sufficient consensus for such action may be difficult to 
achieve. Constitutionally, however, we would argue that multiculturalism is an imperative for 
the development of an inclusive and internally and externally responsible Euro-polity.
26 We 
                                                      
24   See the careful note prepared by the Secretariat to the Convention on the Future of the Union, 
Delimitation of competence between the European Union and the Member States – Existing 
system, problems and avenues to be explored, Conv 47/02 15 May 2002 which explores these 
issues in detail. 
25   See generally J Scott and D Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance 
in the European Union’, (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1-18. 
26   J Shaw, Process, Responsibility and Inclusion in EU constitutionalism: The challenge for the 
Convention on the Future of the Union, Federal Trust Constitutionalism Online Essays, 
www.fedtrust.co.uk/eu_constitution, July 2002. 
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inadequate, the Charter itself is a useful tool for introducing a policy of multiculturalism into 
the EU legal order. In particular, Article 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
referred to above, which takes the form, not of a positive rule but rather of a principle 
according to which other, more individualistic, rights should be interpreted, could form a 
useful model for development of the European Charter. In this context, it is important to 
consider in more detail the use to which the Charter of Rights can be put in the search for a 
EU policy of multiculturalism. 
 
 
2.4  What use is a Charter of Rights?  
We have begun by arguing that the recognition of cultural diversity and the promotion of a 
multi-cultural Europe is not only a moral good in its own right, but is also an important aspect 
in the development of European identity and citizenship as aspects of EU polity-building and 
constitutionalisation. It is now time to move back to the subject matter of this project and to 
consider the role that the EU Charter of Rights can play in this process. Apart from 
instruments in the field of external relations and enlargement (which will be returned to), the 
Charter is perhaps the strongest EU document in which a requirement for the respect of 
cultural diversity is found.
27 To this extent, the Charter can be contrasted with the much more 
limited 1989 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, now effectively enshrined in 
the EC Treaty since the Treaty of Amsterdam, which failed to address the question of 
diversity in any way. The question remains, however, whether the Charter under scrutiny is 
indeed capable of offering a solution to the challenges to multiculturalism which we have 
identified, and of ensuring sufficient respect for diversity to provide a basis for unity within 
the EU. 
Very obviously, the Charter has significant limitations. Its provisions are only 
addressed to the Union, and thus cannot affect the behaviour of Member States unless they 
are implementing provisions of Union law. It cannot itself extend the scope of Community or 
Union competence. Thus, for example, any Member State pursuing policies which are 
sympathetic to the securitisation agenda, or to a general hostility towards ‘foreigners’, cannot 
be prevented by the Charter from doing so unless there are specific provisions of Union law 
which they are implementing (although of course they might fall foul of Article 7 TEU if 
there were persistent breaches of fundamental rights). Even within the context of the Union, 
the Charter is not legally binding and thus cannot affect the normative framework of laws and 
legal institutions, although it has been used by the Advocates General in the Court of Justice
28 
and by some national courts
29 as part of their general human rights jurisprudence or heritage. 
In a technical legal sense, then, the Charter has very little power and very little potential for 
achieving anything. 
Nevertheless, the Charter can provide a useful starting point from which the Union 
can proceed. Its utility derives from two factors. First, the Charter was put together through a 
                                                      
27    Article 151(4) of the EC Treaty does require the Community to take cultural aspects in 
account in its action, in particular in order to respect and protect diversity. However, Article 
151(1) requires the Community to ‘bring the common cultural heritage to the fore’; a 
statement which would seem signficantly to dilute the impact of Article 151(4). 
28   See the opinion of A-G Tizzano in Case C-173/99 R v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry ex parte BECTU [2001] ECR I-4881. Although the use of the Charter has usually 
been restricted to Advocates General, it was referred to by the Court of First Instance in Case 
T-54/99 Maxmobil Telekommunication v Commission. 
29   In the English courts, for example, the Charter was referred to by the Administrative Court in 
R v Wakefield MDC [2002] 2 W.L.R 889 (QBD (Admin Ct)), where Maurice Kay J. stated 
that the Charter was not a source of law in the strict sense, but could be used to interpret, and 
in this case, using Article 8, the data protection provision, update the ECHR. It was also 
referred to by the Court of Appeal in Sepet v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2001] Imm AR 452, where it was used as part of a long list of evidence for the existence of a 
fundamental international right of concientious objection.  
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driven. The Convention which compiled the Charter was relatively representative of the 
different political interests involved even though human rights lawyers did predominate 
amongst its members, and, while the involvement of civil society was not perfectly managed, 
there was some consultation with various representative groups.
30 Subsequently, it was in 
effect agreed to by all the Member States, in the sense that they actively supported its formal 
and solemn ‘proclamation’ by the Presidents of the three political institutions (i.e. European 
Parliament, Commission and Council – the latter representing the Member States) at the Nice 
IGC in December 2000.
31 At a very basic level, this will give it moral authority in 
circumstances where the Union or the Member States are in violation of its principles. Neil 
Walker describes the Charter process as maintaining a significant momentum, even after the 
disappointment to some of its proclamation in declaratory form at Nice.
32 More broadly, its 
very existence as an agreed set of human rights principles and thus an expression of common 
values may well prove to be a springboard for discussion about the way in which those rights 
are to be put into practice. A dialogue which takes place on the basis of an agreed set of 
principles and values is more likely to be productive than one where a principled starting 
point has not been reached. Most fundamental rights adjudication is based around a balancing 
of different interests, and this will still need to be negotiated. However, the existence of 
agreed principles according to which this process should be carried out gives it an invaluable 
head start. Further, strategic questions, such as those concerning problem solving through the 
extension of EU competence into particular areas, can also be debated on the basis of these 
agreed principles. As in Canada, a statement of principle within the Charter can be supported 
and filled out by further legislation and policy developments,
33 although, unlike Canada, such 
a development would require a specific extension of the competence of the Union. 
Secondly, as de Búrca points out, the initial mandate for the Charter suggested that it 
was aimed primarily at the citizens, rather than at the Union or Member States.
34 It was an 
exercise in consciousness-raising, even an attempt to engage in political education – to use a 
very old-fashioned phrase in these days of ‘spin’ – and in making the Union’s commitment to 
rights more visible to citizens. As such, the very existence of provisions making evident a 
commitment to cultural diversity, particularly within education, may prove to be a first step 
along the road of unity through diversity which we have discussed. If multiculturalism is less 
a concrete situation and more a state of mind which is sensitive to certain issues, in principle, 
the demonstration of that sensitivity through the inclusion of those issues in a major document 
such as the Charter should, in itself, be a positive move. 
 
 
3.  CASES UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
 
The Charter, then, has potentially some role to play in mediating the dialogue necessary in 
order to move towards that unity through diversity which is an explicit goal of the EU. Some 
of its strengths and limitations have been outlined, in general terms, in the previous section. 
Here, it is time to look at the specific rights to education and to cultural diversity contained 
within the Charter, to see what they can and cannot achieve. 
 
                                                      
30   See G de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’, (2001) 
26  European Law Review 126-138; F Deloche-Gaudez, The Convention on a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: a method for the future, Notre Europe Research and Policy Paper No 15, 
November 2001 http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Etud15-en.  
31   OJ 2000 C364/1. 
32   N Walker, ‘Human Rights in a Postnational Order: Reconciling Political and Constitutional 
Pluralism’, in T Campbell, KD Ewing and A Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human 
Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) 119 at p120. 
33   Such as, for example, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988, which makes multiculturalism 
the official policy of the government of Canada and grants specific enforcement powers. 
34   Above n.30. 
  93.1 The Right to Education 
The declaration of a right to education in Article 14 has its source in the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and the Article 2 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. However, 
the right to education is also contained within a number of international human rights 
agreements, most notably Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
Article 13 of the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and, within their specific contexts, Article 10 of the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) and Articles 28-30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). The first thing that becomes apparent on comparing the Charter provision with these 
provisions is that the international provisions tend to be much broader. It is common to find a 
general recital as to the purpose and value of education, based on Article 26(2) of the UDHR:  
 
Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all 
nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
 
 
These recitals incorporate reference to relations between cultural groups. Indeed, Article 
29(1)(c) CRC states that one goal of education is: 
 
The development of respect for … his or her own cultural identity, language 
and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, 
the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different 
from his or her own. 
 
This is, to a large extent, to be assured by allowing parents the right to have their children 
educated according to their convictions or culture. However, a number of international 
agreements contain more specific provision for the education of minority cultural and 
linguistic groups.
35 In addition, the ICESCR is ambitious in its aims to secure, eventually, free 
education at primary, secondary and tertiary level. 
In contrast, the Charter, not unlike Protocol 1, Article 2 of the ECHR, is relatively 
laconic. It declares a general right to education and, unlike the ECHR, includes within this 
vocational and continuing education. It also improves on the ECHR in that, paragraph 2 of 
Article 14 explicitly lays down the principle of free compulsory education which, the 
explanatory notes tell us, only implies that each child in compulsory education should have 
the right to attend a school free of charge. This express inclusion of free compulsory 
education may be taken to imply that there is no right to free non-compulsory education, 
whether that be a continuation of compulsory education into higher levels of school, college 
or university, or free access to vocational and continuing training. Thus, while a right to 
education framed in this way can be understood as giving an entitlement to access to 
education, it does not give a right to equal access to education: the right to non-compulsory 
education may be restricted to those who can pay for it, and, even in compulsory education, 
those who can pay may be afforded more choice as to where their child is educated. While the 
latter question is not addressed by international human rights instruments, Article 13(2)(b) 
and (c) ICESCR require the progressive introduction of free education, notably at tertiary 
level. To that extent, the Charter is narrower in scope in terms of guaranteeing accessibility; 
presumably, at least in part, because of the political hot-potato of tuition fees in the UK. 
This point is particularly significant in the context of vocational and continuing 
education. While, as we shall discuss later, education policy has a particular identity-forming 
                                                      
35   Such as, for example, Article 5(1)(c)Convention against Discrimination in Education; Article 
30 CRC. 
  10role within the EU,
36 it is also deeply rooted in the goal of economic development. There is an 
increasing emphasis within policy making on the development of a dynamic knowledge-based 
economy, which requires a highly trained workforce, hence the emphasis on vocational 
training and lifelong learning. More recently, it has also been linked to the development of the 
information society and the knowledge economy.
37 However, the failure to grant anything 
more than a basic right of access to such training has significant potential to exclude. This 
might particularly affect people historically excluded from the workforce, such as those with 
little previous education, or people with disabilities, who may not be in a position to pay for 
training, and for whom training may not be seen to be ‘cost-effective’ by employers or 
potential employers.
38 For such people, the right to education has a particular significance, as 
it provides a way into the employment market. However, equally, that right needs to be 
backed up by practical policies facilitating access. 
Further, the Charter contains neither recitals as to the purpose of education or the 
reasons why such a right is important, nor a right to any particular type of education. 
Paragraph (3), while focused on the question of providing an education in conformity with the 
religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions of the parents, does not confer such a 
right on parents (although it seems to be inferred, and is contained within the ECHR as well 
as within other international agreements) but rather grants the freedom to found education 
establishments, thus allowing for the foundation of schools using particular teaching methods, 
or teaching according to a specific religious or philosophical agenda. In the context of the 
ECHR rights, the European Court of Human Rights has held that this right can be guaranteed 
merely by permitting the existence of private schools, and that the right does not permit 
interference with the defined curriculum within a school, provided it is delivered objectively 
and there is no indoctrination.
39 There is a concordance between this freedom, and the (single 
market) freedom to provide education services and to establish educational establishments 
guaranteed under Articles 43 and 49 EC.
40 However, none of this confers a right on 
individuals to receive an education which conforms to their particular convictions or the 
convictions of their parents. That right could only be effectively exercised in situations where 
such an education is available, and available without charge; a situation which may prove 
unattainable in States with a commitment to a secular identity, such as France. As Dunbar 
points out, such a right granted with no guarantee of State support is a ‘hollow right at best’.
41 
Further, neither the Charter nor the ECHR provide any rights or protections for those who 
wish to educate their children in a particularly cultural, or linguistic, context. The European 
Court of Human Rights has made it clear that what is protected by Protocol 1, Article 2 is the 
religious or philosophical convictions of the parents, rather than their culture or language; 
beliefs, in other words, rather than identity.
42 In particular, in the Belgian Linguistic case, the 
Court stated that the Convention grants no right to education in a minority language, given 
that the State has an interest in preserving linguistic unity.
43 
                                                      
36   On the background of EU education law see B de Witte (ed.), European Community Law of 
Education (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1989). 
37   J Shaw, ‘From the Margins to the Centre: Education and Training Law and Policy’ in P Craig 
and G de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) 555 
at p582 et seq. 
38    Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Dir, requiring reasonable accommodation for disabled 
persons might apply here, although it is open to question whether bearing the costs for training 
would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. 
39   Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark Series A, no 23 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 711. 
40   This is implicit from Case 305/87 Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR 1461 in which the Court 
held that the rights of non-nationals to own property were guaranteed under what were then 
Articles 48, 52 and 59 EEC. 
41    R Dunbar, ‘Minority Language Rights in International Law’ (2001) 50 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 90-120, at p 110.  
42   Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom Series A, no 60 (1991) 13 EHRR 441. 
43   Belgian Linguistic Case Series A, no 6 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252. 
  11As it stands, therefore, the Charter seems to provide a very basic, and limited, right to 
education. However, the right to education has a much broader scope than this. In its General 
Comment on the Right to Education, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights outlined the basic features which need to be assured in order to give meaning to any 
declaration of that right.
44 The comment begins with an important statement of the nature of 
education rights: 
 
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of 
realizing other human rights. As an empowerment right, education is the 
primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and 
children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate 
fully in their communities. Education has a vital role in empowering women, 
safeguarding children from exploitative and hazardous labour and sexual 
exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the 
environment, and controlling population growth. Increasingly, education is 
recognized as one of the best financial investments States can make. But the 
importance of education is not just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and 
active mind, able to wander freely and widely, is one of the joys and rewards 
of human existence. 
 
This statement clarifies the central role which education must have in society, and, 
importantly, its relationship with other rights. Education is the means of empowering 
individuals and groups to make full use of their rights and participate within society. 
However, according to the General Comment, education rights are also dependent on other 
factors. For education rights to be sufficiently guaranteed, they must be available, accessible 
to all (physically, economically, and in a non-discriminatory way), acceptable (relevant, 
culturally appropriate and of good quality) and adaptable to diverse social and cultural 
settings. Thus, while education can be instrumental in making declared rights effective within 
societies, education rights for all can only be fully operationalised in the context of wider 
rights of non-discrimination and of the recognition of cultural and social diversity. 
Looking at it this way, a number of weaknesses can be identified, not only within 
Article 14 itself, but within the wider context of the Charter. Economic accessibility is limited 
by the failure of the Charter to make any statement about free non-compulsory or vocational 
education, despite the implication within the ICESCR that wealthier signatory states should 
be able to assure free education at all levels. Acceptability and adaptability are also 
compromised by the failure of the Charter explicitly to recognise any right to an education 




3.2 The Link Between Education and Culture 
The connection between education and culture made in this piece mirrors the fact that 
both areas are dealt with by the same Directorate-General in the Commission. It is important, 
however, to consider why that might be the case.There are important reasons why we are 
following this institutional lead, which are related to the interconnectedness of, and clashes 
between, cultural rights and educational rights. 
Despite sharing a Directorate-General and indeed a common website on the Europa 
server, an examination of the latter would suggest the links between the two elements are not 
carried further than the D-G’s mission statement. That statement has recently been rewritten, 
and currently gives little help in the search for common ground between the two policy areas, 
linking them by a mission to ‘bring people together to foster respect and understanding’. A 
previous mission statement was more explicit about how this goal is part of both education 
and cultural policy. The keyword here is identity: 
                                                      
44   The right to education: Article 13. E/C.12/99/10, CESCR General Comment 13. 
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Education and culture in the broad sense … not only deeply rooted in national 
identities but also vectors of globalisation, from the most scholarly level to the 
daily realities of the supermarket, the cinema and the Saturday football match. 
 
Thus, there connotes a recognition that education and culture are areas where national 
sensitivities are particularly apparent. However, it is also noted that, as ‘vectors of 
globalisation’, education and culture are ways in which a European identity can be fostered – 
almost as a counterculture. Using education and culture to add a European dimension to 
individual identity, through policies such as educational mobility, promotion of language 
learning, the support of cultural co-operation projects with an European dimension, the 
designation of European Capitals of Culture, and the establishment of a common market in 
broadcasting is an important policy theme. This somewhat impoverished view of cultural 
policy can have significant consequences. If cultural policy is seen as a vehicle for promoting 
European integration and a European identity, rather than as a valid goal in itself, it is surely 
likely that such policy runs real dangers of emphasising the common ground that European 
share at the expense of the differences and, in particular, of excluding from cultural 
consideration those groups which do not have a long history of European identity.
45 
This emphasis on identity forms part of the link between education and culture. Just 
as education and culture are vectors of globalisation, so education can be understand as a 
vector for the transmission of culture. EU policy sees educational mobility not only as a way 
of helping individuals learn more about different EU countries, but more generally as a way 
of introducing an European dimension to the identities of those participating in such schemes. 
This is because education, particularly education for children and young people, is a prime 
means of transmitting wider culture. The type of school or university attended can have an 
important effect on the cultural background of an individual, either confirming or, in some 
cases, competing with, the culture absorbed through family background. Most schools, 
whether state-run or private, will have a role in transmitting the majority national culture, in 
the form of underlying values and attitudes. This will be particularly the case in States where 
some form of citizenship education is on the curriculum, but will happen even without such 
conscious motivation. Thus, in a multi-nation or immigrant State, if the minority cultures are 
to be respected, some way must be found of recognising those cultures within the education 
system.
46 This can be done through multicultural policies which try to ensure that schools do 
not focus solely on the majority national culture, or through the existence of separate 
schools.
47 Multicultural education policy is, as Raz points out, one of the most significant 
concrete policies of multiculturalism as a whole.
48 
This point is recognised to some extent in the EU by its provisions on the education 
of migrant children.
49 However, as Cullen points out, the Directive on migrants’ children is 
marked by policy ambivalence and limitations. First, the issue of competence referred to 
above means that the application of the Directive is limited to the children of migrants from 
other Community countries and requires Member States to take measures to promote the 
culture of the country of origin of the child; i.e. the dominant national culture, rather than any 
minority culture. Secondly, as well as promoting the language and culture of the country of 
                                                      
45   For discussion, in the context of citizenship and cultural policy, see NW Barber, ‘ Citizenship, 
Nationalism and the European Union’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 241-259. 
46    See generally A-G Gagnon and J Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
47   See, for example, Articles 12 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, which require States to ‘take measures in the fields of education and research to 
foster knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities and 
of the majority’ and Article 13, which gives groups the right to set up and manage private 
educational and training establishments (without implying a commitment on the part of the 
State to finance this). 
48   Above n.4. 
49   Dir 77/486 on the education of the children of migrant workers. 
  13origin – in order to facilitate re-integration when the parents return to their country of origin – 
the Directive requires measures to be taken to enable the child to integrate into the host state. 
There is thus as inclarity as to whether the goal of the Directive is to foster integration, or to 
encourage the preservation of the child’s national (rather than cultural) identity.
50 
As well as being linked by the complementarity of focus on identity and education as 
a transmitter of culture, educational and cultural rights can often limit each other. On the one 
hand, education policies can affect cultural rights. Generally speaking, as General Comment 
13 makes clear, education rights can be understood as empowerment rights, and one of the 
things which education can give people is knowledge of and confidence in their cultural 
identity. For example, education through the medium of a minority language encourages the 
continuity and growth of that language and, through that, of the cultural identity expressed 
through that language. Education in the context of and/or which is respectful of particular 
cultural identity has the effect of encouraging children to feel confident within their culture 
and see their culture validated, rather than marginalised. On the other hand, cultural identity 
can affect the exercise of education rights. A good example here is the clash of rights which 
surround the existence of ‘faith schools’. Proponents of such schools argue that, as a religion 
is a fundamental part of cultural identity, it should be a right of parents to educate their 
children in the context of their religious faith. However, a number of other rights must also be 
considered. In the first place, do faith schools have the right to exclude children from a 
different religious background, or no religious background? This problem is particularly 
acute, given the connection between some religions (e.g. Islam) and particular ethnic groups. 
Secondly, what of the rights of the children themselves? Education rights are almost always 
conceptualised as parental rights, with childrens rights being limited to certain aspects of their 
experience within education. However, as the Convention on the Rights of the Child suggests, 
the right to education can be seen as a childrens’ right, as can the right to a particular 
approach to education or type of education. Do faith schools limit the right of children to 
choose not to follow the religion of their parents; a right which, in a liberal society, must be 
maintained? Are faith schools which insist on teaching certain subjects and refusing to teach 
others violating the rights of their pupils to a reasonable and broad education.
51 
 
3.2 Specific  cases 
These general debates are reflected in any number of policy issues arising right across 
Europe. However, current and future developments, as well as providing possible space for 
increased cultural conflict within the EU, also offer the potential for future developments, 
using the Charter provisions as a springboard. 
 
3.2.1  Minority rights, language, education and enlargement 
Minority rights have not traditionally had a place within EU rights discourse. As Schwellnus 
has pointed out, if any move towards minority rights can be detected, it is very recent and, to 
a large extent, a response to the challenges of enlargement.
52 This state of affairs is not 
atypical: within the Council of Europe, for example, minority rights are not included within 
the ECHR (except within the context of Article 2 of the First Protocol) and the Framework 
Convention for National Minorities was only signed in 1995.
53 However, these more recent 
moves within the Council of Europe towards the protection of minorities have not really been 
                                                      
50    H Cullen, ‘From Migrants to Citizens? European Community Policy on Intercultural 
Education’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 109. 
51   This issue has been brought to the fore in recent debates over the right of a Christian school to 
teach creationism as a scientific perspective, and continues to be visible in the issue of sex 
education in schools (see, for example, the case of Kjeldsen et al, above n 39, which 
concerned parental wishes that their children not be given sex education in school). 
52    G Schwellnus, ‘Much Ado About Nothing?’ Minority Protection and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB 5/2001 
http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb/. 
53   This was preceded by the 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. 
  14duplicated at EU level. Given the multi-national and multi-cultural nature of the EU itself, 
some consideration of minority rights would be helpful. 
This state of affairs is all the more puzzling when we consider the extent to which the 
protection by accession states of minority rights has been under the microscope during the 
enlargement process. The 1993 Copenhagen criteria explicitly require that candidate countries 
should achieve ‘stability of institutions … guaranteeing respect for and protection of 
minorities’. This enforcement of this principle has been a significant theme of negotiations 
with a number of candidate States: the treatment of Roma has been and continues to be a 
cause for concern in several states, as has been the position of the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria and the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Provision in all states for 
the protection of minorities, particularly in the context of education and language rights, has 
been closely scrutinised under the enlargement process. This scrutiny suggests that the EU 
places value on minority rights, and considers them to be an essential part of the standards of 
democracy required of Member States of the EU. 
However, once candidate States become Member States, as EU law currently stands, 
that scrutiny will come to an end – barring an application of Article 7 TEU, which the 
Member States purported, in a somewhat skewed way, to invoke against Austria’s new 
government incorporating Haider’s Freedom Party in 2000 and which has been significantly 
widened in relation to its procedures by the Treaty of Nice. The current state of law would 
prevent discrimination on the grounds of race, and there is some Union action combating 
racism and xenophobia, but there are, as yet, no binding provisions requiring States to take 
positive measures to ensure and support multicultural policies. Article 7 TEU could never be 
used to push for positive policies of this nature. Given the complex and ethnic make-up of 
some candidate states, and the deep-rooted divisions which can be found to exist, this 
inability to continue to police the situation may exacerbate problems – even though it can be 
anticipated that scrutiny will continue under the aegis of under international institutions 
including the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the Council of the Baltic States. Further, 
existing Member States are not, and never have been, subject to the same scrutiny as 
accession states. Whether this apparent double standard is based on an assumption that the 
same issues do not exist within existing Member States is not clear, but such an assumption 
cannot be borne out. Further, the EU itself must guard against the violation of minority rights 
and, particularly, language rights. As more national and ethnic groups enter the EU, more 
concerns are likely to arise, both in terms of the maintenance of their national identity, and 
also in terms of their ability to participate politically within the processes of governance. 
Ensuring that new States alone comply with minority rights standards is an inadequate way of 
asserting the value of such standards. 
On this basis, stronger protection minority rights would seem to be an essential part 
of the development of the EU as a multi-national and multi-cultural polity. Schwellnus has 
argued that the existence of Article 22, within the context of EU cultural policy, could provide 
one of the bases of a more developed and coherent minority rights policy.
54 The same can be 
said about Article 14(3). In some ways, it is unfortunate that more specific minority rights 
were not included within the Charter; Article 22 is a rather weak provision, which appears to 
confer positive rights neither on individuals nor groups. Article 14(3) only grants rights to 
education providers, rather than the recipients of that education and is, as we have already 
suggested, limited to groups with a common belief, rather than a common identity. 
Nevertheless, particularly when combined with the recent development of legislation 
outlawing race discrimination and a broadening policy on the elimination of racism and 
xenophobia,
55 Articles 14 and 22 could be a way of opening a dialogue which could lead to 
the creation of positive rights for minorities. 
 
                                                      
54   Above n.52. 
55   For the connection between race legislation and minority protection, see D Chalmers, ‘The 
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  153.2.2  Education, culture and citizenship 
A second area to be considered is the eternal question of citizenship. If citizenship is 
understood as having two aspects – a citizenship of identity, and a citizenship of political 
rights – education and culture have central roles to play in both of those aspects. In terms of 
identity, we have already argued that education has an important role to play in the 
developing of common cultural identity. However, the question of European identity remains 
contested. One of the explicit roles of EU education and cultural policy is to help in the 
development of that European identity, through, by and large, initiatives which promote that 
which is common amongst Europeans, rather than that which divides us. It could be argued, 
indeed, that this aspect of EU cultural policy tends towards the assimilation of the different 
national cultures into an abstract ideal of what it is to be Europe, at the expense of their 
individual cultural identities. 
If this is the case, it has wide implications. Cultural pluralism does not always follow 
the same model. A distinction needs to be made between multi-nation polity, which is 
comprised of a number of complete historical communities within one state; examples include 
the United States, Canada and Australia (where indigenous nations were colonised and 
conquered by the now dominant nation) and Belgium (where federalism was a much later 
development) and Switzerland (formed from a more or less voluntary act of federation), and 
pluralism caused by individual or familial immigration, where the developing immigrant 
communities often continue to have links with the country of origin of themselves or their 
ancestors. Kymlicka argues that these types of cultural pluralism need to be understood 
separately, as they can give rise to different challenges.
56 The EU, of course, is a multi-nation 
polity. However, it is important not to forget that immigration forms another aspect of its 
pluralistic character.
57 An emphasis within cultural policy on common European 
characteristics, based on a historical perception of a common European identity, can serve to 
exclude immigrant communities, who do not share in the whole of that history. One effect of 
this can perhaps be seen in the Culture 2000 project, where the scarcity of projects originating 
from immigrant communities which are given funding is noticeable. This latter, exclusionary 
tendency should be of particular concern in the light of recent events, and more broadly what 
has been argued to be a significant incidence of racism throughout the EU.
58 
The political side of citizenship also poses challenges. The development of a 
cohesive, consensus-based and democratic polity is precisely what is required in order to 
support a multicultural citizenship in Europe. Attempts to form, or identify, a sufficiently 
strong European identity upon which to base citizenship would seem doomed to failure. 
European unity itself is, to a great extent, based on diversity, as the European Parliament has 
recognised.
59 Kymlicka argues that, in general, it is extremely difficult to identify sources of 
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  16unity such as to form the basis of a common citizenship in a multicultural society.
60 The only 
way for any multicultural polity to work is to value the diversity of the people within it. Raz 
takes this further, arguing that respect for cultural groups is essential to ensure the 
identification of members of those groups with the wider polity.
61 The recognition of and 
respect for diversity can be the source of unity of a multicultural polity. The idea of unity 
through diversity is the way forward. 
Respect for the rights of cultural groups, however, needs to be based something other 
than identity politics. The challenges to multiculturalism based on the practical impossibility 
of the unity of diverse cultures into one must be taken seriously. It is definitely the case that, 
as Walzer puts it, ‘the solid lines on the old cultural and political maps are turned into dotted 
lines.’
62 Cultures are being seen as less rigidly defined and exclusive. In multicultural 
societies, the language, customs and eating habits of each culture are being influenced by 
those of the others. Even within less pluralist societies, the influences of a global mass media, 
tourism, and returning emigrés have led to a blurring of the lines between local and more 
alien cultures. Nevertheless, distinct cultural groupings and identities continue to play an 
important part in the way in which individuals see themselves and their loyalties. 
Canada again provides a useful point for discussion here. While the search for a 
distinctive Canadian identity has not been absent from Canadian constitutional debates, 
perhaps because of the tensions between the English-speaking and French-speaking 
populations, that identity has necessarily had to be looser in nature. Helly goes so far as to 
argue that multiculturalism has become part of Canada’s founding ideology,
63 and it is 
certainly the case that the unity of the Canadian state is not based on a monocultural identity. 
In this context, ethnos and demos appear to have been uncoupled; the solution which, 
according to Lehning, is the only way to found a European identity which cannot be based on 
ethno-cultural characteristics.
64 Lehning goes on to suggest that it is the rights and 
opportunities for participation within the democratic process which can form the basis of a 
common European identity. In a wider context, Wheatley argues that rights of political 
participation are essential to ensure the inclusion of minority groups within the polity.
65 This 
view is supported by the work of Tully, who argues that a sense of belonging within a 
multicultural society can be engendered by the participation of different cultural groups in 
dialogue and deliberation about the constitutional development of that society. Such 
participation is important because it marks an acknowledgement of the existence and needs of 
minority groups, and also allows society as a whole to respond to the dymanic identities of 
different groups, rather than to a reified stereotype.
66 This needs to form part of the wider 
democratisation of the EU. However, education policy also has a role to play. It is through 
education that citizens can be taught about their citizenship and can be made aware of their 
rights and their identity as members of specific cultural groups who need to be heard. An 
education policy which is sensitive to diversity and promotes multiculturalism as a moral 
good, but which also embraces the need to teach about political citizenship can contribute 
towards wider participation of minority groups. 
                                                      
60   Above n.3. 
61   Above n.4. Raz’s argument seems to based on the idea of a number of smaller cultures being 
part of one wider culture. The complexity of culture may mean that a rather more fluid, multi-
level model needs to be used. Nonetheless, the basic point still seems valid.  
62   M Walzer, ‘The Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World’ 
(1997) 10 Ratio Juris 165-176 at p 176. 
63   D Helly, ‘The Political Regulation of Cultural Plurality: Foundations and Principles’ (1993) 
25 Canadian Ethnic Studies 15-35. 
64    PB Lehning, ‘European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity?’ (2001) 20 Law and 
Philosophy 239-282. 
65   S Wheatley, ‘Minority Rights and Political Accommodation in the ‘New’ Europe’ (1997) 22 
European Law Review Supp HRS 63-81. 
66   J  Tully,  Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). The importance of dialogue is also referred to by Abu-
Laban above n.56). 
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Here, however, we can also return to the Charter. The ideals of participation of civil 
society in the decision-making process and of consensus politics rather than majority 
decision-making are ideals which can facilitate the political integration of minority groups. 
They are also the ideals which informed, to a great extent, the process of drafting the Charter. 
It has been suggested that this process, which has been hailed as a great success, could be 
used for future decision-making - particularly the Convention on the Future of Europe. It may 
be that the biggest contribution which the Charter can make to inclusive citizenship within 





This paper has begun the process of exploring the intersections between the ideals or 
‘promise’ of multiculturalism, as a response to the challenges of diversity within modern 
society, and the EU’s concerns regarding policies on education and culture, both in the 
context of the current Treaty framework and, specifically, the innovations provided by the 
2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights. Quite apart from the inherent challenges in developing 
policies of multiculturalism within any polity, it is clear from the analysis above that there are 
particular difficulties attaching to any attempt to match multicultural policies to the EU’s 
limited goals and competences. Yet as a supranational governance structure, the EU 
constitutes a potentially powerful venue within which the values of tolerance and diversity 
awareness could be effectively articulated, should the political will be present. This can be 
achieved, using techniques of ‘new governance’ without unnecessarily constraining or 
interfering with the autonomy of the Member States. 